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DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING LAW
1980-81

Each volume of the Annual Review of Banking Law will feature
a section highlighting the important legal developments of the previous year that affect
financialinstitutions. The intent of the "Developments in Banking Law" section of the
Annual Review is to provide the reader with a summary of selected developments. iVo
attempt is made to provide an exhaustive survey. In this, ourfirst volume, the years
1980-81 are spotlighted; in the future, each volume will concentrateon a single year.
EDITOR'S NOTE:

OVERVIEW: 1980-1981
The years 1980 and 1981 were marked by a continuation and acceleration of change in the nation's financial institutions in general and in depository institutions in particular. Until recently, the banking and thrift
industries have been unique in possessing the capacity to thrive in a changing economy without changing very significantly themselves. This phenomenon was largely attributable to a regulatory environment that
protected depository institutions, minimizing competition from unregulated financial entities and imposing a form of organization that permitted
institutions to thrive while conducting their activities in traditional ways.
The advent of stubbornly high inflation and historically high interest rates
in the late 1970's led to a series of innovations outside the regulatory
scheme, and depository institutions faced competition in areas over which
they had retained a virtual monopoly. The development and growth of
money market mutual funds, the widespread use of commercial paper to
replace bank financing, the growth of foreign bank entry into the United
States, the creation of non-bank financial giants - these developments,
combined with unprecedented technological developments, began a process that has left banks and thrifts faced with competition in spheres tradi-
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tionally immune from challenge while they are effectively blocked by regulatory restraints from engaging in many of the lucrative activities open to their
new competitors. This has led to unprecedented pressures to alter the
regulatory structure.
After decades of a relatively stable regulatory environment, the late
1970's were marked by the enactment of major new banking legislation. The
Financial Institutions Regulatory Act and the International Banking Act,
both adopted in 1978, though adding to the existing regulation of depository institutions, were important because these enactments established an
environment in which major legislative change became acceptable. The
success of unregulated competition made deregulation inevitable and led to
the enactment in 1980 of the Monetary Control and Depository Institutions
Deregulation Act, a harbinger of what will assuredly be further change. By
providing for a phase-out of deposit interest rate regulation, the Act represents the first significant loosening of the restrictions imposed in the aftermath of the Great Depression. In an era when Congress has substantially
deregulated the transportation and communications industries, the environment is conducive to a significant reexamination of the regulatory restraints which, though proper in an earlier age, may no longer reflect
economic reality.

RESTRICTIONS ON BRANCHING AND INTERSTATE
BANKING
Perhaps the most controversial issue of the late 1970's and early 1980's
has been the continued restrictions on branching both within states and
across state lines. Although a number of states in recent years have relaxed
their branching restrictions,' some states continue to prohibit branching
entirely or permit it on a severely restricted basis.2 Fundamental changes in
the American banking industry, particularly the advent of new technology
exemplified by automated teller machines and electronic funds transfer,
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.26(b) (West Supp. 1981) (changed from total
prohibition to a limit of two branches per county and then to statewide branching);
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.1 (1975) (changed from restrictions within cities to restrictions within counties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19 (West Supp. 1981) (changed from
restrictions within counties to statewide branching).
2 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-157 (1977); W.
VA. CODE § 31A-8-12 (1975).
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have placed significant strains on these restrictions.3 The McFadden Act's 4
goal of competitive equality in branching between national and state banks
and the Douglas Amendment's 5 restriction on bank holding companies'
controlling banks in more than one state have been the objects of increased
criticism.
Congress recognized the importance of these issues when, in the International Banking Act of 1978,6 it directed the President to conduct a study
and render a report on the continued viability of the McFadden Act. The
President's report was formally issued in January 1981 and included not
only a study of the McFadden Act, but an examination of the broader issues
under the Douglas Amendment as well. 7 The report supports a phased
reduction of current restrictions on branching, primarily through relaxation
of the prohibitions on bank holding companies' controlling commercial
banks in more than one state. Although concluding that the McFadden Act
is "ineffective, inequitable, inefficient and anachronistic," the report did not
recommend its abandonment or modification. 8 Instead, the report urged
states that impose restrictions on branching to reevaluate their policies in
light of prevailing market forces and to liberalize restrictions on intrastate
geographical expansion.9
The report did, however, recommend immediate legislative action to
permit deployment of electronic funds transfer terminals across state lines,
initially limited to the standard metropolitan statistical area in which an
institution is located, but ultimately nationwide.' 0 Finally, the report recommended that interstate acquisitions of failing banks by bank holding companies be permitted."I By the end of 1981, Congress had not yet implemented
the report's recommendations. The House of Representatives took the only
significant legislative action by approving the "Regulators' Bill," authorizing interstate and cross-industry mergers in instances of failing depository
3

See Comment, EF. . 's and Competitive Equality?:A Doctrine That Does Not Com-

pute, 32 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1978); Note, Effect of the Use of Customer-Bank Communication

Terminals on Competition Among FinancialInstitutions, 45 U.
4 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976).
5 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1) (1976).
6 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. 11 1978).
7

U.S.

CIN.

L. REV. 591 (1976).

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, GEOGRAPHIC

STRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING

8 Id. at 17.

9 Id. at 18.
I0Id. at 19.
I Id. at 20.

IN THE U.S.

(Jan. 1981).

RE-
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institutions under the supervision of federal regulators. 2
The industry response to congressional inaction has been to develop
techniques to ameliorate the effects of these restrictions. Although commercial banks have been unsuccessful in expanding their deposit-taking activities, a number of developments portend change in the near future. First and
foremost has been a series of interstate mergers of federally insured savings
and loan associations. In order to avoid the liquidation of failing institutions, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) has
engineered the mergers of a number of financially healthy savings and loan
institutions with troubled associations in other states.' 3 In most instances,
the FSLIC has provided financial incentives to offset some of the economic
burdens undertaken by the healthy associations. The acquiring institutions,
however, have absorbed a portion of the losses as part of the cost of expanding their deposit-taking operations to another state. The expansion by
thrifts across the state lines and the likelihood that this expansion will
continue have produced strong pressures to permit commercial banks to
operate on an interstate basis as well in order to ameliorate a perceived
competitive disadvantage. At the end of 1981, proposals were pending
before Congress both to permit interstate takeovers by banks and to impose
prohibitions on further interstate mergers by savings and loan associa4
tions.'
Perhaps the most important developments in the area of interstate
banking were the actions taken in 1980 by South Dakota and in 1981 by
Delaware. The legislatures of both states enacted statutes permitting out-ofstate bank holding companies to establish limited-function banks within
their borders.' 5 The South Dakota statute was intended to attract the bank
credit card operations of large money center banks located in states that6
impose below-market usury limits on open-ended consumer financing.'
H.R. 4361, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
'3 See First InterstateSubsidiary Takes Over Savings Bank, Am. Banker, Mar. 16, 1982,
at 1, col. 3; Interstate Merger Creates Largest FederalS & L, Am. Banker, Nov. 23, 1981,
at 1, col. 2. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has also announced that it
would permit out of state banks to bid for failing mutual savings banks. See FDIC to
Let Out-of-State Firms Bid for Failing Savings Banks, Am. Banker, Dec. 22, 1981, at 1,
col. 3.
14 H.R. 4095-4098, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (interstate branching); H.R.
4102, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (banks acquiring failing thrifts).
'5 S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-16-40 (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 802
(1981 Interim Supp.).
16 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-16-40 (1980).
12
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Inasmuch as South Dakota does not impose interest rate ceilings on this type
of loan, a national bank located in that state can impose any interest charge
on credit card financing, regardless of where the cardholder resides or
where purchases are made.' 7 This legislation induced Citicorp to charter an
institution in South Dakota and transfer its credit card operations to that
state from its headquarters in New York.
South Dakota's initiative was followed by Delaware legislation that authorized out-of-state bank holding companies to establish state-chartered
banks.' 8 The Delaware statute, however, was more ambitious than South
Dakota's in its attempt to attract some of the commercial banking activities
of large money center banks in addition to their credit card operations. The
principal incentive is a substantially lower tax on bank activities than that
imposed by other states, particularly New York and Pennsylvania. The statute also removed the usury ceilings for credit card operations. To protect
the purely local business of Delaware banks, the statute imposes limitations
on the activities of these out-of-state-owned banks.' 9 The effect of these
initiatives has been to exert pressure on other states, such as New York,
Pennsylvania and Maryland, to raise their permissible usury ceilings and to
reconsider their systems for taxing bank assets, activities and income.
A second type of state initiative surfacing during 1981 that may have
a major'impact on interstate banking is the authorization for out-of-state
banks to acquire or charter a bank within a state. At year-end, the legislatures of Maine and Alaska were giving serious consideration to proposals
permitting some form of entry by out-of-state institutions without any requirement of reciprocity from other states. The adoption of these provisions
could result in entry by large banking organizations from other states. The
purpose of these proposals is to attract large money center banks to acquire
banks in these states at a premium while other states continue to limit entry
by out-of-state firms. Whether the activities of these two states portend a
broader movement that will spread to other states is unclear at the present
time.
Finally, a number of bank holding companies have recently adopted a
strategy of positioning themselves for the expected relaxation of the Douglas Amendment. Typically, this is being accomplished by a holding company's purchasing less than 5 percent of the voting shares of a bank located
in another state while also acquiring a sizeable block of nonvoting stock
17 See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 802 (1981 Interim Supp.)
19 Id.
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convertible to regular common shares if interstate restrictions are relaxed.
Some of these arrangements also provide for options to purchase additional
shares of the target bank. 20 These devices permit a holding company to
acquire a "non-controlling" interest which can be converted into a control2
ling interest in the event interstate restrictions are modified. '

THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
In early 1981, the Supreme Court finally resolved the dispute over the
Federal Reserve Board's regulation permitting bank holding companies and
their nonbanking subsidiaries to act as investment advisors to closed-end
mutual funds. In Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute,22 the Court
held that the narrowly circumscribed regulation authorizing companies to
engage in this activity did not violate the Glass-Steagall Act's proscriptions
on securities activities of banks or the "closely related to banking" requirements contained in Section 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act. 23 The
restrictions the Board has imposed upon a holding company wishing to
engage in this activity suggest that the legal struggle may have been well out
of proportion to the actual value banks can derive from this new activity.
Under the regulation, the bank holding company may not have any ownership interest in, nor extend credit to, the investment company sponsoring
the fund, and is prohibited from underwriting or otherwise participating in
the sale or distribution of the investment company's securities. 24 Moreover,
proposals currently pending before Congress to amend Glass-Steagall
would, if adopted, grant banks as well as bank holding companies increased
25
authority to sponsor and advise mutual funds.
20 See, e.g., Boston B.H.C. Buys Stock in Maine B.H.C., IJuly-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP.
(BNA) No. 49, at A-14 (Dec. 14, 1981); NCNB Corp. Seeking Entry Into FloridaBanking
Market Despite Intent of FloridaLaw ProhibitingAcquisition by Out of State Banks, Wall St.
J., May 23, 1981, at 2, col. 2; Banks Grab Footholds Out of State, Betting That Restrictions
Will End, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1981, at 35, col. 4.
21 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)2 (1976).
22450 U.S. 46 (1981).
23 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 377 (1976). (Glass Steagall); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1976)
(bank holding company act). See Comment, Bank Holding Companies Attempt to Enter
a Forbidden Market- Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 976.
24450 U.S. at 52, (citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.125(f), (g), (h) (1980)).
25 See, e.g., S. 1670, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1981); S. 1424, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
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An important decision of the Supreme Court in 1980 imposed major
limitations on the authority of states to prohibit out-of-state holding companies from engaging in nonbanking activities in the state. In Lewis v. B. T.
Investment Managers,26 the Court invalidated a Florida statute that sought to
prevent banks and bank holding companies from operating investment advisory affiliates in Florida.27 This attempt to preserve these investment advisory business activities for Florida banks and trust companies was held to
violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 28 Of special interest was
the Court's holding that Section 7 of the Bank Holding Company Act,2 9
which secures to each state "such powers and jurisdiction which it now has
or may thereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and
subsidiaries there," preserves only that state authority that "operates within
the boundaries marked by the commerce clause" and does not permit state
legislation inconsistent with the provisions of the Bank Holding Company
30
Act.
The continuing decline in the stability of the thrift industry and the
burden this has placed on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) has
caused the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board)
to indicate a willingness to reconsider its long-standing policy of not permitting bank holding companies to acquire thrift institutions. 3' In a letter to
Chairman Isaacs of the FDIC, Chairman Volker of the Board of Governors
expressed the Board's support 32 for the so-called Regulator's Bill, passed
by the House in October 1981, permitting cross-industry and interstate
mergers of failing thrift institutions. 33 In the event the Senate fails to act
favorably, however, Chairman Volker indicated that "the Board would be
prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, applications by a bank holding
company for the acquisition of a failing thrift institution in instances where
the possibility of such an acquisition would importantly reduce the costs and
U.S. 27 (1980).
Id. at 49.
28 U.S. CON9T. art I, § 8, cl. 2.
29 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1976).
30 447 U.S. at 49.
31 See D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 FED. REs. BULL. 280 (Mar. 1977).
32 Volker Says Fed May Let Bank Holding Companies Buy Thrifts, [Jan.-June]
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-I (Jan. 4, 1982).
33 See H.R. 4361, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); H.R. 4603, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1981).
26447
27
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,, 34 This indicates that despite its prior holdings that
risks involved ....
savings and loan activities do not meet the "proper incident to banking"
requirement of Section 4(c)(8) ,35 the Board's view is that the Act itself does
not prohibit acquisition of thrifts. This attitude is underscored by the
Board's approval in 1980 of a New Hampshire holding company's acquisi36
tion of a stock thrift institution.

USURY LAWS
The extraordinary rise in interest rates that began in the late 1970's
resulted in a scarcity of funds for borrowers in states that imposed belowmarket interest ceilings on loans. Restrictive usury laws affected home mortgage and consumer loans in particular, with business and agricultural loans
also becoming scarce in states that imposed similar restrictive usury ceilings
on them. In 1980, Congress responded by adopting Title V of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act (DIDA), which contains a permanent override of state usury limits on first mortgage residential loans, and a three-year
override of usury limits on business and agricultural loans of $25,000 or
more.37 DIDA entirely exempted mortgage loans from any usury limits, but
established a ceiling of 5 percent over the Federal Reserve discount rate for
business and agricultural loans. 38 In both instances, Congress granted the
states the authority to reject the federal overrides by expressly reinstating
their usury limitations by statute or constitutional provision.39 DIDA also
created parity between national banks and state-chartered, federally insured
depository institutions by permitting the latter to charge a maximum inter40
est rate one percent over the discount rate on any type of loan.
34 Fed. FDIC Exchange Letters on Possible Acquisition of Thrift Institutions by
Bank Holding Companies [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at T-1 (Jan. 4,
1982).
35 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976).
36 First Fin. Group of N.H., 66 FED. RES. BULL. 594 (1980). In reaching this
decision, however, the Board noted the unique nature of stock thrift institutions
("guaranty savings banks") in New Hampshire, and their traditional relationship
with commercial banks in that state.
37 94 Stat. 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1735f-7(a) (West Supp. 1981)).
38

Id.

12 U.S.C.A. § 1735f-7(b) (West Supp. 1981).
12 U.S.C.A. § 1831d(a) (West Supp. 1981). See also Samuels, Usury Preemption,
the Federal State Scheme, 98 BANKING L.J. 892 (1981).
39

40
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The DIDA overrides had little effect on consumer loans, including
credit card transactions, that remained subject to state interest ceilings. A
1978 decision of the United States Supreme Court construing the usury
provisions of the National Bank Act 41 authorized national banks to charge
the maximum rate permitted by the bank's home state on credit card purchases by nonresidents of that state.42 Bank holding companies that found
the profits on their credit card operations seriously affectedby limitations
imposed by their home states began seeking a jurisdiction that did not
impose usury limitations. The need was filled when Delaware 43 and South
Dakota 44 adopted legislation permitting the chartering of limited-function
banks by foreign holding companies. The result was the departure of the
credit card operations of Citibank from New York to South Dakota and,
similarly, the credit card operations of a number of Pennsylvania and Maryland banks from their home states to Delaware. This exerted considerable
pressure on states to remove or raise their consumer loan rates and upon
Congress to override the remaining state usury restrictions. At the end of
1981, bills were pending in Congress to achieve that result. 45

THE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION
AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980
One of the major objective of Congress in 1980 when it enacted DIDA
was to permit depository institutions to compete with money market funds
and other unregulated investment opportunities." To achieve that end, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee was established "to provide for the orderly phase-out and the ultimate elimination of the limitations
on the maximum rates of interest and dividends which may be paid on
deposits and accounts as rapidly as economic conditions warrant." 47 DIDA
4112 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
42 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., supra note 17, 439 U.S.
299 (1978).
43 DEL. COnE ANN. tit. 5, § 802 (1981 Interim Supp.).
44 S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-16-40 (1980). See text accompanying notes
15-18, supra.
45 See S. 963,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1406,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
46 See S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODECONG. & AD. NEWS 237, 239-40.
47 12 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b) (West Supp. 1981).
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directs the Committee, composed of the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board and National Credit Union Administration, and, as a nonvoting member, the Comptroller of the Currency, 4 8 to accomplish an orderly phase-out of interest rate ceilings over a
period not to exceed six years. 49 At the time Corigress adopted DIDA, it was
assumed that prevailing market rates would decline in the near future and
that a gradual increase in permissible rates would be tolerable for the thrift
industry. The persistence of inordinately high money market rates, however, led to serious opposition from thrifts and small banks to any further
increase in or removal of interest ceilings. As a consequence, the members
of the Deregulation Committee have disagreed over the proper course of
action and have been the subject of criticism for their efforts to follow the
statutory mandate and increase permissible rates. As 1981 concluded,
50
proposals were rife for restricting or restructuring the Committee.
In addition, in U.S. League of Savings & Loan Associations v. Depository
InstitutionsDeregulationCommittee,s" the court held that the Committee's regulation lifting rate ceilings immediately on newly created four-year certificates and phasing out the ceilings on shorter term deposits over a period
of four years was impermissible. 52 The court found that DIDA did not repeal
Public Law 94-200, which requires that a quarter percent differential favoring thrift institutions be maintained on maximum interest rates of existing
accounts unless otherwise approved by Congress.5" This decision makes it
virtually impossible for DIDA to eliminate interest ceilings on any existing
forms of accounts prior to 1986. The response may be to create accounts
of novel durations which presumably are not subject to the differential
requirement, and which would be attractive alternatives to existing deposit
instruments. At year-end, the members of the Deregulation Committee
remained divided over how to proceed, and the only significant deregulation step that the committee took was to authorize depository institutions
12 U.S.C.A. § 3502 (West Supp. 1981).
49 12 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (b) (West Supp. 1981). See U.S. League May Sue DIDCAgain
Over "Absolutely Disappointing"Decisions, [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 27,
at A-21 (July 6, 1981). The National Credit Union Administration is not bound by
the Deregulation Committee.
50 Cranston, Five Other Senators Push Bill for One- Year Moratorium on DIDC Actions
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 47, at A-12 (Nov. 30, 1981); id. at A-28.
[July-Dec.]
5t
No. 81-1666 (D.D.C. July 31, 1981) (unpublished).
52 Id.
48

53

Id.
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to offer unregulated Individual Retirement Accounts. 54
Congress in 1980 also passed the Monetary Control Act (MCA).5 The
MCA requires alldepository institutions to maintain reserves against transaction and time deposits. Although the Federal Reserve Board exempted
financial institutions with deposits of less than $2 million, 56 the provision,
when fully operative, will place the same reserve requirements on institutions that are not members of the Federal Reserve System as those placed
on member institutions. In addition to establishing parity between member
and nonmember institutions, the measure will enable the Federal Reserve
Board to better monitor and control the nation's money supply.

MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND ANTITRUST DECISIONS
In 1981, courts overturned on antitrust grounds three of the Board's
decisions involving bank acquisitions by bank holding companies. In County
National Bancorp. v. Board of Governors,57 Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of
Governors5 8 and Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors,59 the courts of
appeals vacated Board orders that denied proposed acquisitions based on
the Board's finding that consummation of the proposed acquisitions would
lessen potential competition. The courts reversed the Board's determinations because the proposed acquisitions did not violate the Sherman or
Clayton antitrust acts. The courts rejected the Board's argument that under
the Bank Holding Company Act 60 it could deny an acquisition or merger
if it finds anti-competitive effects that, though falling short of violating the
antitrust laws, nevertheless thwart the convenience and needs of the community.6' The decisions were significant not only because they limited the
grounds upon which the Board could deny applications, but also because
54

Dec.]
5

DIDC Upholds Rate Deregulation, Abandons Move for Penalty Free Rollovers, UulyWASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 47, at A-7 (Nov. 30, 1981).

- Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. 1, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
56 ACUA Votes Final Deregulationof Credit Union Share Accounts, [Jan.-June] WASH.
FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 17, at A-6 (April 27, 1981).
57 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981).
58638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
59649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir, 1981).
60 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841et. seq. (1976).
61 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976).
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they rejected the Board's assertion of discretion authoritatively to interpret
this section of the Bank Holding Company Act. In light of the extreme
deference the federal courts have traditionally afforded to the Board's construction of the statutes it administers, particularly the Bank Holding Company Act, these decisions represent a significant assertion of judicial
62
authority over construction of the Act.
Another interesting development in the merger area was the ruling that
a bank lacks the requisite interest in the emergency acquisition of one of its
competitors by a third bank to give it standing to challenge the Comptroller's plan arranging the takeover. 63 This decision, if read expansively and
followed by other federal courts, could have the effect of insulating emergency takeovers from challenge except by the Justice Department.

INTERNATIONAL BANKING
Congress enacted the International Banking Act of 1978 6 principally
to promote competitive equality between foreign banks, which had been
permitted multistate branching, and United States banks. 65 By grandfathering existing facilities of foreign banks, either in place or applied for as of
July 1978,66 the Act did not reduce the existing multistate presence of
foreign banks. The Act did, however, foster competitive equality by limiting
new deposit-taking facilities of foreign banks to a single state. 67 In addition,
the Act prohibited foreign bank holding companies from acquiring Ameri68
can banks outside the state in which its lead bank is located.
The effect of these provisions has not been to slow markedly the increase of foreign bank branches within the United States. By mid-1980, the
Federal Reserve Board reported that 150 foreign banks operated 332
62 See Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., supra note 22; 450 U.S. 46
(1981); Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
63 Marshall & Isley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1981), petitionfor
cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1981) (No. 81-964).
64 Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
65 International Banking Act of 1978, § 3(b), 12 U.S.C. § 3103(b) (Supp. III
1979). See generally Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United States, 1980 ILL. L.F. 1.
66
International Banking Act of 1978, § 5(b), 12 U.S.C. § 611(a) (Supp. III
1979).
67 Id., § 5(a)(1-4), 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (Supp. III 1979).
68 Id., § 5(a)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (Supp. III 1979).
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69
branches and agencies in the United States with assets of $123 billion.
Foreign bank holding companies have also completed a number of sizeable
domestic acquisitions, most notably Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation's acquisition of Marine Midland Bank, and Midland Bank's
acquisition of Crocker National Bank.70 Whether the Act will ultimately slow
foreign bank activities in the United States is not clear. In any case, the loss
of the ability to expand into multistate deposit-taking can be expected to
account for some diminution in the level of foreign banks' interest in the
United States market.
Perhaps the most significant new development in this area since the
passage of the International Banking Act was the Federal Reserve Board's
adoption of regulations authorizing the establishment in the United States
of international banking facilities (IBF) and treating them as if they were
located offshore. 7' These IBF's will be permitted to accept deposits when
the funds involved are to be used primarily for foreign transactions .72 These
facilities will enable domestic banks to compete with offshore operations
because deposits in IBF's will not be subject to reserve requirements or
Regulation Q interest rate limits. 73 In 1981, Congress amended Section
3(l)(5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to ensure that IBF deposits
would be exempt from deposit insurance requirements.7 4 Permitting United
States banks to establish IBF's will enable domestic banks to shift offshore
operations from subsidiaries located in foreign countries, such as Singapore, the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, to the United States.
A suit brought by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the
New York Attorney General challenged the Comptroller's power to charter
and to approve federal branches and agencies of foreign banks operating
in the United States.7 5 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
upheld the Comptroller's authority granting the states a veto power over
69 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,

[1980]
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228 (1981).
70 See Remarks of H.C. Wallich, Member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Perspectives on Foreign Banking in the United States, Conference
on Foreign Banking in the United States (Mar. 1, 1982.).
71 Amendments to Regulations D and Qfor International Banking Facilities, 46
PORT

Fed. Reg. 32,426 (1981).
72

Id. at 32,427.
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74 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(1)(5) (West Supp. 1981).
75 Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Heimann, [Current Binder] FED.
98,900 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1981).
BANKING L. REP. (CCH)

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

/ 1982

foreign entry only if "the type of operative the foreign application seeks is
76

•. . itself prohibited."

PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISMCLAUSE

THE DUE-ON-SALE

Perhaps the most dramatic conflict between federal and state law arose
over the validity of due-on-sale clauses contained in mortgages issued by
federally chartered institutions. A due-on-sale clause requires the mortgagor to pay the entire balance due on the mortgage if the property subject to
the mortgage is transferred. Thus, a subsequent purchaser cannot assume
a mortgage containing a due-on-sale clause without the permission of the
lender. Since 1978, the California courts have held that due-on-sale clauses
interfere with the free alienation of property and are unenforceable by
lenders. 77 The California Court of Appeals has applied this ruling to federally chartered savings and loan associations despite a Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB) regulation 78 authorizing the use of due-on-sale
clauses. 79 Courts in a number of other states without specific legislation on
the subject have considered the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses with
differing results.80 Bankers argue that the FHLBB regulations authorizing
use and enforcement of due-on-sale clauses by federal savings and loans

76

Id.

Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 970
(1978). Previously, the court had held due-on-sale or similar clauses enforceable
only on installment sales. See Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629,
526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
5 Cal. 3d 864. 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
7812 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-11(f),(g) (1980).
79 SeeDe la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175
Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981).
80 A number of courts have held that a due-on-sale clause is unenforceable. See,
e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.
77

1981) Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978).

Conversely, a number of courts have held that the clause is enforceable. See, e.g.,
Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, 423 N.E.2d 998 (1981); Stith
v. Hudson City Sav. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1970); People
Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
See Finch, Due-on-Sale Clauses in Debt Instruments and Market Realties, 98

L.J. 300 (1981).
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preempt conflicting state law. 8' As 1981 ended, the issue of whether state
or federal law would prevail was headed for the Supreme Court for an
82
ultimate decision.

BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES AND SECURITIES LAW
DECISIONS
The securities activities of banking organizations have become an important focus of bank regulators in the past two years. As commercial banks
and thrifts have encountered greater competition from non-banks, particularly money market funds and other liquid investment vehicles, the restraints imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act 83 have become more
burdensome.8 4 At the end of 1981, proposals were pending before Congress
to eliminate or modify many of the Act's restrictions on banks' securities
activities. These include permitting banks or bank holding companies to
underwrite revenue bonds, offer money market funds and provide brokerdealer services. What, if anything, will emerge is difficult to predict since the
competing interest groups - banking industry against securities industry,
81 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1979) provides the following:

Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power to enforce,
as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan
instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately
due and payable sums secured by the association's security instrument if all
or any part of the real property securing the loan is sold or transferred by
the borrower without the association's prior written consent. Except as
provided in paragraph (g) of this section with respect to loans made after
July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied by the
borrower, exercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a
due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan
contract and all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall
be fixed and governed by that contract.
In addition, 12 C.F.R. § 556.9 (1976) sets forth the FHLBB's policy statement on
the validity of due-on-sale clauses.
82 De la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 79, prob.juris.noted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S.Jan. 25, 1982) (No. 81-750). Petitioner argues that both the
Federal Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976) and
FHLBB regulations preempt California law prohibiting enforcement.
83 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1976).
84 See Clark & Saunders, JudicialInterpretationof Glass-Steagall: The ATeed for Legislative Action, 97 BANKING L.J. 721 (1980); Lowenstein, The Commercial PaperMarket and
the Federal Securities Laws, 4 CORP. L. REV. 128 (1981).
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large banks against smaller banks, commercial banks against thrifts - could
thwart legislative efforts to deal with the apparent imbalance.
In addition to the Supreme Court's approval of bank holding companies' offering advisory services to closed-end mutual funds,85 the Federal
Reserve Board has approved the sale by banks of third-party commercial
paper to institutional investors. In authorizing banks to engage in this activity, the Board held that commercial paper is not a "security" and therefore
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act 86 does not prohibit banks from underwriting third-party commercial paper. A district court, however, has overturned this construction of the Glass-Steagall Act and held that banks may
8 7
not underwrite commercial paper.
The United States Supreme Court decided two cases concerning the
application of federal securities law to banking activities. In one case the
Court upheld the SEC's determination that a pledge of stock as collateral
for a loan is an "offer or sale" of a security as defined by federal securities
laws. 88 This permits the borrower to seek redress against the lender for
violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.89 At the
end of 1981, the Court was also about to consider whether a pledged
certificate of deposit is a security under the 1933 and 1934 securities acts. 90

CHARTERING
In October 1980, the Senate Banking Committee released a majority
staff study on "Chartering of National Banks: 1970-1977."' 9 The study was
highly critical of the Comptroller's chartering practices. In particular, the
study found that the Comptroller's "chartering policy was overly restrictive
85 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
(1981).
See text accompanying notes 22-25, supra.
46
86 See Letter from Theodore Allison, Secretary of the Board, to John Lifton,
Esq., and Harvey Pitt, Esq. (Sept. 26, 1980), reprintedin [ 1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
98,435 (Nov. 31, 1980).
BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
8
7 A.G. Becker v. Federal Reserve Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1981).
88 Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
89 15 U.S.C. § 7 1(q) (1976).
90 In Marine Bank v. Weaver, No. 80-1562 (U.S. March 8, 1982), the Court held
that a certificate of deposit was not a security, based on the existence of the bank
regulatory scheme and federal deposit insurance.
91 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,

HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,

CONG., 2D SESS., CHARTERING OF NATIONAL BANKS:

96TH

1970-1977 (Comm. Print 1980).
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S.. [and] more interested in protecting existing banks during this period
than in promoting competition in meeting the banking needs of the public."92 The Staff also concluded that the Comptroller's published standards
were vague and provided the Comptroller with "unbridled discretion" in
93
the chartering process.
Shortly after publication of the report, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) issued revised regulations covering the chartering
process. 94 The new regulations address some of the same issues raised by
the Senate study and explain in greater detail the factors and procedures
being followed by the OCC. More important, the new regulations provide
that "[i]t is not the policy of the Office to ensure that a proposal is without
risk nor to protect existing competitors from competition a new bank will
provide." 95 This statement appears to meet partially the objection that existing institutions have been protected from the competition of new entrants
that are willing and able to establish a new national bank, although the
objection is not fully overcome by this statement because the OCC still
requires that "the proposed bank will have a reasonable likelihood of success . . .. 96 If this requirement entails an assessment of the proposed
institution's chances of surviving in a competitive environment, then the
Comptroller could use this standard to protect existing banks by finding
that a community is "overbanked" and to deny applications for new charters
on this ground.

CONSUMER CREDIT
The major legislative development in the field of consumer credit during the past two years was the Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform
Act. 97 Since its passage in 1965, the Truth-in-Lending Act 98 (TiLA) has
been the subject of numerous suits and administrative rulings which have
created a confusing body of law. The Simplification Act reduced the com92
93

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.

12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (1981).
12 C.F.R. § 5.20(c) (1981).
96 Id. This criterion finds its roots in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1814(b), 1816 (1976).
97
Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
98 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1661-65 (1976).
94

95
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plexity and length of disclosures, particularly in closed-end credit transactions. In addition, the Simplification Act amended the liability provisions for
statutory damages, limiting class action liability generally, and imposing
liability only for failures to make material disclosures. Coverage of TiLA was
also amended to exclude agricultural credit and to include mobile home
transactions. 9 The Federal Reserve Board has undertaken a revision of
Regulation Z '0 to comply with the Simplification Act.
In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled on various provisions of TiLA
in the last two years. In Ford Motor Credit Company v. Milhollin,'01 the Court
held that a creditor need not disclose to the consumer the creditor's right
to accelerate the maturity of a consumer's debt. 02 More important than its
specific holding, however, was the Court's admonition to lower courts that
they follow the interpretations of TiIA provided by Federal Reserve Board
staff. The Court stated that "[u]nless demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve staff opinions should be dispositive ... "103 Following the spirit of
Milhollin, and relying on Board interpretations, the Court, in Anderson Brothers Ford v. Valencia,'" held that an assignment of unearned insurance premiums does not create a "security interest" that must be disclosed under
TiLA. 0 5 Finally, in American Express Company v. Koerner,10 6 the Court held that
an individual using a business credit card for business purposes is not
entitled to TiLA protections. 0 7 These decisions, together with the passage
of the Simplification Act, indicate a trend away from the strict application
of consumer protection measures evident in years past.
In 1978, Congress passed the Electronic Funds Transfer Act 108 to
clarify relationships of participants in electronic funds transfers systems
and, in 1980, the Federal Reserve Board adopted Regulation E under the
99 See generally Boyd, The Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act - A MuchNeeded Revision Whose Time Has Finally Come, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1981); O'Connor,
Truth-in-Lending Simplification, Esquire, 36 Bus. LAw. 1161 (1981).
100 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1981).
101 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
102 Id. at 560-61.
103 Id. at 564.
104452 U.S. 205 (1981).
105 Id. at 222-23.
106452 U.S. 233 (1981).
107 Id. at 241-42.
108 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (Supp. 111 1979). See Brandel & Schellie, Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, 35 Bus. LAw. 1275 (1980); Note, The Electronic Funds Transfer Act-A
Departurefrom Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1007.
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Act.' 0 9 Regulation E, which is applicable to all electronically initiated consumer fund transfer transactions, requires that financial institutions provide
their customers with a disclosure statement containing a description of the
customer's rights and potential liabilities as well as the rights and liabilities
of the institution itself." 0 The regulations also require that financial institutions provide documentation of transfers "' and notice of the effectuation
of preauthorized transfers," 2 and limit a consumer's liability, for unauthorized transfers. 113 Of primary importance are the provisions concerning error
resolution.114 After a customer gives notice of an error, the financial institution must promptly correct the mistake and recredit the account." 5 Regulation E is an attempt by the Board to balance the needs of the customer and
the financial institution in a rapidly changing area and, therefore, the Board
6
has been flexible in its requirements."
109

12 C.F.R. § 205 (1981). See Connors, The Implementation of the Electronic Funds

Transfer Act-An
110 12 C.F.R.
"' 12 C.F.R.
112 12 C.F.R.
11' 12 C.F.R.
114 12 U.S.C.

Update on Regulation E, 17
§ 205.7 (1981).
§ 205.9 (1981).
§ 205.10 (1981).
§ 205.6 (1981).
§ 205.11 (1981).

115 Id.
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See Connors, supra note 109, at 358.
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